United Nations S/2012/655

Security Council

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21 August 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 20 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Over the past several days, the most senior Iranian leaders have issued yet another series of outrageous statements, which called for the destruction of Israel and spread the vile anti-Semitism that forms the core of their ideology.

Yesterday, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, publicly stated that "Zionism is a danger for entire humanity" and that Israel "is a cancerous tumor ... in [the] heart of [the] Muslim world".

In remarks last Friday, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that "the very existence of the Zionist regime is ... an affront to all world nations" and called on "all human communities to wipe out this scarlet letter, meaning the Zionist regime, from the forehead of humanity".

Iran's President repeated a number of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and slurs, including that "the two world wars were designed by Zionists ... [who] have been inflicting very heavy damage and suffering on the whole of humanity for over 2,000 years".

On the same day, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of the Aero-Space Forces of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, threatened that Iran would take action to destroy Israel, saying "the forged regime will be wiped off the map and thrown into the trash bin of history forever".

These are just a few examples of the hate speech that we heard echoing from the pulpits, podiums and television sets in Iran during the past several days. Iran — a Member State of the United Nations — continues to declare that it seeks the destruction of Israel, another Member State of the United Nations.

As Israel has made clear in previous letters to the Security Council, complacency in the face of Iranian hate speech and incitement is dangerous. The delusional statements of Iran's leaders are not those of crazy people, but rational fanatics, with irrational hatreds. One can only imagine what such an extremist regime would do if it got its hands on the world's most dangerous weapons.

There are certain times when silence is not an option. We expect the Security Council and all responsible members of the international community to condemn Iranian hate speech without any further delay.

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Israel **Nitzan**
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2012/656

Security Council

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21 August 2012
English
Original: French

Letter dated 13 August 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you of the work of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), whose current mandate expires on 30 August 2012. Since its official inauguration in March 2011 and the assumption of Office by my Special Representative for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA, Mr. Abou Moussa, in June 2011, UNOCA has been assisting my efforts to further advance the cause of peace and security in the Central African subregion. UNOCA has been closely monitoring developments and has provided briefings and periodic reports to the Security Council.

The Security Council, in its presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/21) of 14 November 2011, requested me to coordinate and develop, through UNOCA, a regional strategy to address the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), in close collaboration with national, regional and international partners. In addition, in its presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/18) of 29 June 2012, the Security Council endorsed the regional strategy and urged UNOCA to support its implementation. Further, in its resolution 2039 (2012), the Security Council requested me to support, through UNOCA and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), States and subregional organizations in convening a joint Summit of Gulf of Guinea States to develop a regional anti-piracy strategy.

With the extension of its mandate, UNOCA, in addition to its work on the Lord's Resistance Army and on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, will continue, inter alia, to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Cooperate with the Economic Community of Central African States, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and other key partners and assisting them, as appropriate, in their promotion of peace and stability in the broader Central African subregion;

(b) Carry out good offices roles and special assignments in countries of the subregion, on behalf of the Secretary-General, including in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts;

(c) Strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the subregion;

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(d) Enhance linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the subregion, with a view to promoting an integrated subregional approach and facilitating coordination and information exchange, with due regard to specific mandates of United Nations organizations as well as peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding support offices;

(e) Report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance.

I therefore recommend a further extension of the mandate of the Office for 18 months.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations S/2012/657

Security Council

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21 August 2012
English
Original: French

Letter dated 21 August 2012 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 13 August 2012 (S/2012/656) concerning your proposal to extend the mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) for an additional 18 months, until 28 February 2014, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the proposal contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Gérard **Araud**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations A/66/892–S/2012/658

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 August 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 43
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Letter dated 16 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 16 August 2012, addressed to you by Hilmi Akil, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hüseyin **Müftüoğlu**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 16 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter, dated 11 July 2012, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/66/868-S/2012/536), which yet again contains typical assertions of violations of "international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus", and to bring to your kind attention the following.

In response to such presumptuous allegations, I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. It must be stated that assertions of so-called violations of air traffic regulations are invalid, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services.

As noted in our previous letters, such contentions are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This presumptuous contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the island of Cyprus, namely, the existence of two independent, self-governing States, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

Continuing attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false claims, to confer legitimacy upon an illegal administration will be futile, since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to its unjust demands. What would indeed be conducive to a better atmosphere on the island would be for the Greek Cypriot side to stop misappropriating for itself the rights and responsibilities that it does not legally have, and to cease its hostile and derogatory acts against the Turkish Cypriot people.

Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the North of the island does not bode well for the prospects of a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, namely, a partnership based on a bizonal, bi-communal federation with the political equality of the two Constituent States.

I would like to put on record once again that, despite the Greek Cypriot leadership's apparent lack of enthusiasm for compromise and its denial of the equal partnership rights of the Turkish Cypriots on the island, the Turkish Cypriot side is ready and doing its best for achieving a settlement in the form of a new partnership which will be in line with the established United Nations parameters and body of work.

(*Signed*) Hilmi **Akil**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/ES-10/561–S/2012/659

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 August 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 21 August 2012 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am compelled to draw your attention and, through you, the attention of the international community, to the ongoing and intensifying acts of violence, terrorism and racist hate crimes being perpetrated by illegal Israeli settlers as well as Israeli citizens against Palestinian civilians and their properties in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

The latest vicious incident of settler terror took place on Thursday, 16 August 2012, when illegal Israeli settlers from the settlement of "Bat Ayin" near Bethlehem in the Occupied West Bank hurled a firebomb at a car, painted bright yellow, clearly marking it as a Palestinian taxi. The taxi was carrying six Palestinians, all from the same family, including two 4-year-old children, who were headed to a nearby supermarket. The terror attack caused the car to flip over into a ditch and caused injury to all six passengers, including second- and third-degree burns to the face and body of the passengers. One passenger, the father of the family, Ayman Ghayaza, sitting next to the driver, remains in serious condition. Furthermore, a short while after the settler terror attack was reported, six additional firebombs were hurled at cars with Palestinian licence plates on a central road in the Occupied West Bank.

Despicable and destructive acts against Palestinian civilians and their properties, such as this latest act of settler terror, have continued unabated and over the past year have increased. This can easily be attributed to the fact that Israel's illegal settlement colonization campaign and the settlers residing within the settlements are funded, protected and armed by the Israeli government, which has transferred and enabled them to live in these illegal settlements in grave breach of international law, including, in particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and which allows them to commit such crimes against defenceless Palestinians throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory with absolute impunity. The lawlessness of the settlers, including deadly violence, terror, harassment and intimidation against Palestinian civilians and their properties, is facilitated, aided and abetted by the

occupying Power which bears full responsibility for the illegal presence and all the illegal actions of the settlers. The international community, including the Security Council, must compel the occupying Power to act forthwith to bring an end to the terror campaign being perpetrated by the Israeli settlers against the Palestinian civilian population under its 45-year-old ruthless occupation.

I would now like to turn your attention to another cruel and barbaric incident which involved an attack against three Palestinian youths by a mob of 50 Israelis in Jerusalem's city centre, also on Thursday, 16 August 2012, the same day as the vicious settler firebomb attack on the taxi transporting the family of six mentioned above.

The hate crime — described by several witnesses as an attempted lynching — occurred as Jamal Julani, 17 years old, a resident of the Occupied East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Ras Al-Amud, and his four friends were walking in West Jerusalem's Zion Square, when they suddenly found themselves being chased by a group of youths shouting "Arabs, death to Arabs". Ten of the 50 Israelis chasing Julani and his friends finally caught Julani and began beating him, kicking him even after he fell to the ground, unconscious.

All of this took place as hundreds of bystanders stood by watching. When paramedics arrived on the scene, Julani no longer had a pulse and they had to use cardiopulmonary resuscitation and defibrillators for more than 10 minutes before his pulse returned. To add to the repulsiveness of this latest hate crime was the statements made in an interview to reporters by one of the Israeli suspects, who said that "if it was up to me, I'd have murdered him" and that "he could die for all I care — he's an Arab". Julani remains in the hospital in serious condition.

This brutal hate crime highlights the growing racist sentiment of Israelis towards Palestinians, a sentiment that is promoted by some of Israel's political and spiritual leaders who help to foster a toxic atmosphere by condoning and even encouraging violence against Palestinians. Moreover, it is also fostered by the mere reality of the fact that Israeli governmental officials continue to be lax in bringing the perpetrators of violence and hate crimes against Palestinians to justice, as there are only a few indictments or convictions in dozens of cases of assaults on Palestinians and their property every year. We call on the international community to strongly condemn this latest hate crime and compel Israel to take swift action against the perpetrators and bring them to justice. We also call on the international community to call on the occupying Power to end the incitement to violence by Israeli political and spiritual leaders against Palestinians as well.

Relevant to the issues of impunity discussed in the present letter, we would also like to bring to your attention that, on 12 August 2012, an Israeli court convicted an Israeli soldier — who had deliberately killed in cold blood Raya Abu Hajjaj and her daughter Majda, who were clearly holding up white flags, during Israel's war against the Gaza Strip in late December 2008 and in the beginning of January 2009 — to just 45 days of imprisonment. This latest decision by an Israeli court clearly provides further proof of the flagrant disregard for the lives of Palestinian civilians by the occupying Power and confirms the absence of individual criminal responsibility against those who commit heinous crimes against innocent Palestinian civilians.

Continuation of the current unjust, violent, racist and hate-filled situation will only further exacerbate the tense situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and between Palestinians and Israelis, further stoking anger and rage, deepening mistrust and further endangering the dwindling prospects for a peaceful settlement of this conflict. This explosive situation thus requires urgent attention and serious action by the international community, including by the Security Council, in accordance with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 432 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 26 June 2012 (A/ES-10/560-S/2012/492), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2012/660

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 August 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 22 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to a recent Israeli media blitz relaying reports that the regime's Prime Minister and Defense Minister have decided to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. These reports indicate that Israeli officials, unwarrantedly and based on erroneous and false presumptions regarding the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, threaten the use of force against the Islamic Republic of Iran by signalling the imminence of an Israeli attack on the nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to such an extent that the former Vice-Prime Minister of the Israeli regime in a televised interview insinuated that such a purported Israeli attack has been planned in "a hasty and irresponsible" manner.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses, once again, its deep concern over, and strong condemnation of, such a provocative, unwarranted and irresponsible statement by the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister as well as other officials of the Israeli regime who frequently threaten the Islamic Republic of Iran with a military strike. Such statements are in flagrant violation of the most fundamental provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles of international law, and are against the global efforts to strengthen regional and international peace and security.

The irony is that there has been no reaction on the part of Western leaders and/or relevant organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council, vis-à-vis the inflammatory remarks and baseless allegations levelled against the peaceful nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Rather, some even spare no occasion to align themselves with such statements.

Needless to say, the Israeli regime's record of crimes and atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and its clandestine development and unlawful possession of nuclear weapons are unparalleled in the world. Contrary to the Israeli records, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a leading nation in rejecting all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, on many occasions, declared that nuclear weapons are the most lethal and inhumane weapons and therefore have no place in the defence doctrine of the country.

I wish also to reiterate my Government's position that the Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention of attacking any other nations. Nonetheless, in accordance with its inherent right under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Islamic Republic of Iran would not hesitate to act in self-defence in response to any attack against the Iranian nation and to take appropriate defensive measures to protect herself.

I would highly appreciate it if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Eshagh **Al Habib**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/66/890–S/2012/661

General Assembly
Security Council

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23 August 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda items 35, 39, 67 and 83

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 17 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In addition to our previous letters dated 25 April, 10 May and 20 July 2012 (A/66/783-S/2012/271, A/66/798-S/2012/313 and A/66/875-S/2012/573), I have the honour to draw your attention to the reaction of the international community to the illegal "presidential elections" held on 19 July 2012 in the occupied Daghlyq Garabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh) region of the Republic of Azerbaijan (see annex).

In their statements and communications, the international organizations and individual States voiced their unequivocal protest against the aforementioned "elections" and declared this provocative action null and void. Accordingly, it has been made clear that, against the background of continuing aggression, occupation and ethnic cleansing of the captured territories of Azerbaijan, the arranging of any kind of voting process in these territories cannot be recognized as legally valid and in no way can impose a unilateral solution.

The clearly expressed unanimity of the international community confirms that the attempts to give the ethnically constructed subordinate separatist regime set up by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan the appearance of legitimacy are, a priori, doomed to failure. We are confident that the policy of colonization and annexation of the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan has no chance to succeed and that Armenia will be obliged to completely withdraw its armed forces from the Daghlyq Garabagh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, to denounce

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its territorial claims towards neighbouring nations, to respect international law and to establish civilized relations with all countries of the region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 39, 67 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tofig **Musayev**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the letter dated 17 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Reaction of the international community to the illegal "presidential elections" held on 19 July 2012 in the occupied Daghlyq Garabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh) region of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Below are excerpts from some statements and communications of international organizations and individual States.

In her statement dated 18 July 2012 regarding the "presidential elections" in Nagorno-Karabakh, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, reiterated that "the European Union does not recognize the constitutional and legal framework in which they will be held" and that "these 'elections' should not prejudice the determination of the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiated general framework of the peaceful settlement of the conflict".[1]

The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, expressed the organization's rejection of the so-called "presidential elections" in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Secretary General further emphasized the organization's "continuous support to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of respect for the principles of territorial integrity of States and inviolability of internationally recognized borders".[2]

The Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Eamon Gilmore, stated that "the OSCE does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh" and that "the 'presidential elections' should not exert any impact on efforts to settle the conflict in the agreed format".[3]

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassadors Robert Bradtke of the United States, Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, and Jacques Faure of France, in their statement dated 20 July 2012, noted that "none of their three countries, nor any other country, recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent and sovereign state". According to the Co-Chairs, "the procedures of 19 July in no way prejudge the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh or the outcome of the ongoing negotiations to bring a lasting and peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict".[4]

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[1] European Union, statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Nagorno-Karabakh, Brussels, 18 July 2012, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131842.pdf.

[2] "OIC rejects the so-called elections in Nagorno-Karabakh", 19 July 2012, available from www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=7041.

[3] "OSCE chairman releases statement on 'presidential elections' in Karabakh", 19 July 2012, available from www.azertag.net/en/node/982203.

[4] Statement of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, 20 July 2012, available from www.osce.org/mg/92313.

The Special Representative of the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the Caucasus and Central Asia, James Appathurai, stated on 19 July 2012 that "NATO, like other international organizations, does not recognize so-called presidential elections held in Nagorno-Karabakh", and that "the holding of such elections does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement to the conflict".[5]

In her letter of 21 May 2012 addressed to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, Susana Malcorra, underlined that the Daghlyq Garabagh region constitutes part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, qualified the so-called "presidential elections" as fictitious and assured the Azerbaijani side that the United Nations was not involved in their conduct. The Secretary-General encouraged all sides to remain engaged in the search for a peaceful and lasting solution and expressed his hope that the negotiations could be accelerated with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey stated on 18 July 2012 that "the so-called 'presidential elections' will be held on 19 July 2012 in the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which remains under the occupation of Armenia, in total contravention of international law and contrary to the expectations of the international community". According to the position of Turkey, the "elections constitute a clear breach of the Security Council resolutions and OSCE principles" and represent "a new example of the unilateral efforts to legitimize the present unlawful situation in Nagorno-Karabakh". In that regard, while deploring this act, which violates Azerbaijan's political unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, Turkey stated that it "will not recognize the results of these so-called 'presidential' elections, which it considers illegitimate and certainly null and void in terms of international law".[6]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, in its statement of 19 July 2012, "reaffirm[ed] the Georgian government's unequivocal support for Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity", and pointed out that it "does not recognize the so-called 'presidential elections' which were held in Nagorno-Karabakh on 19 July 2012".[7]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania stated on 19 July 2012 that it "considers the so-called presidential elections held on 19 July 2012 in the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh as deprived of legitimacy", and "reiterating its constantly asserted position of principle to the effect of not recognizing the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[5] Available from www.aznatomission.be/?/en/news/view/202/.

[6] Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey "regarding the so-called 'presidential elections' to be held in Nagorno Karabakh", 18 July 2012, available from www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-188_-18-temmuz-2012_-yukar%C4%B1-karaba%C4%9F_da-d%C3%BCzenlenecek-s%C3%B6zde-_ba%C5%9Fkanl%C4%B1k_-se%C3%A7imleri-hk_.en.mfa.

[7] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia "in reaction to the so-called 'presidential elections' held in Nagorno-Karabakh on the 19th of July 2012", 19 July 2012, available from www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=59&info_id=15368.

expresses confidence that this ballot will in no way prejudice the process of finding a peaceful, negotiated solution to the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region".[8]

In its statement of 19 July 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic underlined that "the Czech Republic does not recognize [the] constitutional and legal framework within which [the] elections took place". According to the statement, "the Czech Republic is of the view that these elections do not contribute to the creation of a more positive atmosphere for the solution of the frozen conflict".[9]

The Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Azerbaijan stated on 19 July 2012 that "Moldova, along with other countries, does not recognize the so-called 'presidential elections' in Nagorno-Karabakh", and that it "supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and stands for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict".[10]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated on 20 July 2012 that, as well as all other countries, Russia "do[es] not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state" and "do[es] not consider that the results of the process of peace settlement could depend on these elections".[11]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia stated on 20 July 2012 that it "does not recognize the 'presidential elections' held in Nagorno-Karabakh on 19 July and does not recognize the results thereof". In this context, the Ministry "express[ed] concern about the lack of progress in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the escalation of incidents and the rising number of victims", and "call[ed] on all parties involved to solve the conflict through negotiations.[12]

In its statement of 20 July 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary emphasized that the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict "must be achieved by peaceful and negotiated means, on the basis of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the states concerned, as well as the respect for the rights of minority communities". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary fully aligned itself with the statement of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, of 18 July 2012, stating that the European Union does not recognize the constitutional and legal framework in which [the 'elections' of 19 July 2012 in Nagorno-Karabakh] were held, and that "these 'elections' should not prejudice the determination of the future

[8] Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania "on the so-called presidential elections in the Nagorno-Karabakh separatist region", 19 July 2012, available from www.mae.ro/en/node/14605.

[9] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic "on presidential election in Nagorno Karabagh", 19 July 2012, available from www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/statements/x2012_07_19_statement_of_mfa_on_presidential_election_in_nagorno_karabagh.html.

[10] Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Azerbaijan, "The position of the Republic of Moldova regarding the so-called 'presidential elections' in Nagorno-Karabakh", available from www.azerbaidjan.mfa.md/anounsments-ro/492607/.

[11] Briefing of the Official Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, A. K. Lukashevich, "On the so-called 'presidential elections' in Nagorno-Karabakh", 20 July 2012, available from www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/6904234485666204442 57a44002aea68!OpenDocument.

[12] Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia on Nagorno-Karabakh, 20 July 2012, available from www.am.gov.lv/en/news/press-releases/2012/july/20-1/.

status of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiated general framework of the peaceful settlement of the conflict".[13]

The Federal Foreign Office of Germany stated on 19 July 2012 that "the Federal Government does not recognize any Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, its representatives and elections held there" and that this constitutes the position of the European Union expressed by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton.[14]

The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, in its communication dated 20 July 2012 to the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Switzerland, informed that "the Swiss Confederation respects the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders and does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is part of the Republic of Azerbaijan".

In its statement of 20 July 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia qualified the "presidential elections" held on 19 July 2012 as illegitimate and underlined that "the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States Members of the United Nations is the fundamental principle on which the international order is based". In that regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia stated that "these elections cannot prejudice the future status of the region or the ongoing negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the conflict".[15]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China stated on 21 July 2012 that "China's position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been clear and consistent, and remains unchanged". China expressed its hope that "parties concerned can peacefully resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in a way acceptable to all sides through consultation and dialogue in accordance with the universally recognized norms of international law and relevant Security Council resolutions. This not only serves the interests of all parties concerned, but also contributes to regional peace, stability and development".[16]

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[13] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary on Nagorno-Karabakh, 20 July 2012, available from www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/news/statement-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-hungary-on-nagorno-karabakh.

[14] The Federal Foreign Office of Germany, press conference on 20 July 2012, available from www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2012/07/2012-07-20-regpk.html.

[15] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 20 July 2012, available from www.mfa.gov.rs/Srpski/Pressframe.htm.

[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, remarks by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei, 21 July 2012, available from www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t955112.htm.

United Nations S/2012/662

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 August 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 22 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of my Government, in its capacity as Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, I have the honour to inform you of the present stage of deliberations of the International Conference concerning the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and, in that connection, am transmitting herewith the declarations adopted at the summit meetings of the Heads of State and Government, held in Addis Ababa and Kampala on 15 July and 8 August 2012, respectively (see annexes).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Adonia **Ayebare**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

12-47131 (E) 300812

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Annex I to the letter dated 22 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government

Addis Ababa, 15 July 2012

We, the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, meeting in Addis Ababa at the headquarters of the African Union on 15 July 2012, in the margins of the 19th Ordinary Session of the African Union Meeting, held on 15 and 16 July 2012, on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo with a view to consolidating peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region,

Having considered the report from the Extraordinary Meeting of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held in Addis Ababa on 11 July 2012 at the headquarters of the African Union on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Cognizant of the gravity of the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the fact that it constitutes a serious threat to peace, security, stability and development in the entire Great Lakes region,

Aware of the persistence of the negative forces and armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Mindful of our commitment as expressed in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region of 20 November 2004, stating our collective determination to transform the Great Lakes region into a space of sustainable peace and security for States and peoples, political and social stability, shared growth and development, a space of cooperation based on the strategies and policies of convergence within the framework of a common destiny which we are determined to build,

Acknowledging the firm commitments made by the Heads of State of the Great Lakes region in the International Conference Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region on 15 December 2006 and its Protocols, specifically the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region,

Evoking the decision made during the 4th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State of the International Conference in Kampala on 15 and 16 December 2011 to eradicate existing armed groups in the region in conformity with the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region,

Do hereby decide as follows to:

1. Approve and endorse the decisions of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee;

2. Condemn in the strongest terms the actions of the 23 March Movement (M23) and other negative forces operating in the region and support the efforts deployed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the restoration of peace and security in North Kivu Province;

3. Condemn in the strongest terms the continued and unfettered activities of the Forces démocratique de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and call for immediate military action to eradicate this threat;

4. Direct the appropriate structures of the International Conference to work with the African Union and the United Nations for an immediate establishment of a neutral international force to eradicate M23, FDLR and all other negative forces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and patrol and secure the border zones;

5. Direct the Ministers of Defence of the International Conference to reconvene in the shortest possible time to review, oversee and fast-track the implementation of the decisions on negative forces in the Great Lakes region made during their meeting in Kigali on 9 September 2011;

6. Demand that the negative forces, in particular M23, immediately stop armed activities and that no support should be given to any negative force to destabilize the region and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular;

7. Call upon the member States of the International Conference to fully implement the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region and in particular the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region;

8. Urge the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to fully implement their existing bilateral mechanisms in addressing the insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and specifically the full operationalization of the Joint Verification Mechanism and to open up the latter to other member States;

9. Call upon the international community to provide, as a matter of urgency, an appropriate humanitarian support to victims of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in North Kivu Province, and to extend assistance to the victims wherever they may be;

10. Urge officials in member States of the Great Lakes region to ensure that their actions, behaviour, speeches, public statements, contributions and any other utterances be inscribed in the logic of peace, security and stability to be artisans and promoters of peace;

11. Immediately establish a follow-up mechanism by the revival of the team of special envoys, namely, Benjamin Mkapa and General Olusegun Obasanjo, to address the root causes of the problem of insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and propose a sustainable solution and request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to facilitate the exercise;

12. Set up an ad hoc group of experts composed of six independent experts as per article 25 of the Pact that would prepare and submit a report on eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to the next meeting of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee;

13. Direct the secretariat of the International Conference to follow up on the implementation of the decisions of the Extraordinary Summit and provide regular reports thereof to the Chair of the International Conference.

Done in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 July 2012

1. H.E. JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS
President of the Republic of Angola

2. 1er Vice-President
H.E PIERRE NKURUNZIZA
President of the Republic of Burundi

3. H.E. FRANÇOIS BOZIZE
President of the Central African Republic

4. P.O. Chef
H.E. DENIS SASSOU-NGUESSO
President of the Republic of Congo

5. H.E. JOSEPH KABILA
President of the Democratic Republic of Congo

6. H.E. MWAI KIBAKI
President of the Republic of Kenya

7. H.E. PAUL KAGAME
President of the Republic of Rwanda

For 8. Amb. Abdalla Wadi
H.E. OMAR HASSAN AHMED EL BASHIR
President of the Republic of the Sudan

9. H.E. JAKAYA MRISHO KIKWETE
President of the United Republic of Tanzania

10. H.E. YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
President of the Republic of Uganda

For 11. Ambassador Francis Simenda
S.E. MICHAEL CHILUFYA SATA
President of the Republic of Zambia

Annex II to the letter dated 22 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government

Kampala, 7 and 8 August 2012

We, the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, meeting in Kampala on 7 and 8 August 2012, at the invitation of Yoweri Museveni, the President of the Republic of Uganda and Chair of the International Conference, to discuss the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Recalling our decision made in Addis Ababa on 15 July 2012 to meet in Kampala to discuss the root causes of insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and to find ways to solve the humanitarian crisis in the area,

Taking note of the Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the International Conference on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, held in Khartoum on 1 August 2012,

Having considered the report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, held in Kampala on 6 August 2012,

Cognizant of the gravity of the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the fact that it constitutes a serious threat to peace, security, stability and development in the entire Great Lakes region,

Cognizant also of the serious deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo due to the armed activities of the so-called 23 March Movement,

Recalling our firm commitment to the International Conference Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region of 15 December 2006 and its related Protocols,

Recalling our declaration on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo made at the Addis Ababa Extraordinary Summit of 15 July 2012,

Noting that the diplomatic efforts so far undertaken by the region through the Chair of the Summit, President Yoweri Museveni, have created a lull in the fighting in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Determined to seek home-grown solutions to the problems of the Great Lakes region through our established regional mechanisms,

Considering that the Kampala Summit discussions were held in a convivial, fraternal and constructive atmosphere,

Do hereby decide as follows to:

1. Undertake vigorous efforts with a view to ensuring that there is a complete halt to fighting in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, without excluding the possibility of sanctions against those who obstruct the peace process;

2. Support the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to restore peace and security in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in North Kivu Province;

3. Establish a subcommittee made up of the Ministers of Defence of the Republic of Angola, the Republic of Burundi, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania and

- Mandate the subcommittee to propose urgent actionable steps to ensure that fighting stops completely in order to allow for consolidation of peace, security and stability;
- Mandate the subcommittee to provide details on the operationalization of the Neutral International Force;
- The Subcommittee of Ministers to be chaired by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Uganda;
- The Chair of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee to also provide support to the subcommittee of ministers regarding all diplomatic aspects;

4. Request the subcommittee to submit its interim report to the Chair of the International Conference in two weeks, and its final report to the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference in four weeks;

5. Request the Chair of the International Conference to continue his consultations, including with a view to reengaging the team of special envoys and to consolidating peace in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo;

6. Set up a trust fund to support victims of the humanitarian crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring countries, urge member States and other partners to contribute to the fund and thank the Government of Uganda for contributing $1 million to the fund;

7. Call upon the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and ensure that access of humanitarian aid to the victims is not obstructed;

8. Thank the Government and the people of Uganda for the warm hospitality in hosting the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State.

Done at Kampala, Uganda, on 8 August 2012

1. .....
H.E. JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS
President of the Republic of Angola

2. .....
H.E PIERRE NKURUNZIZA
President of the Republic of Burundi

Ministre Cooperation
P.O

3. .....
H.E. FRANÇOIS BOZIZE
President of the Central African Republic

4. .....
H.E. DENIS SASSOU-NGUESSO
President of the Republic of Congo
P.O. le Ministre de la défense nationale

5. .....
H.E. JOSEPH KABILA KABANGE
President of the Democratic Republic of Congo

6. .....
For H.E MWAI KIBAKI
President of the Republic of Kenya

7. .....
H.E. PAUL KAGAME
President of the Republic of Rwanda

8. .....
8/8/2012
For H.E. OMAR HASSAN AHMED EL BASHIR
President of the Republic of the Sudan

9. .....
H.E. JAKAYA MRISHO KIKWETE
President of the United Republic of Tanzania

10. .....
H.E. YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
President of the Republic of Uganda

11. .....
Hon Edgar C Lungu MP.
pp H.E. MICHAEL CHILUFYA SATA
Min of Home Affairs.
President of the Republic of Zambia

United Nations S/2012/663

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 August 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 22 August 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and with reference to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the eleventh programme of work of the Committee for the period from 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013 (see annex).

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Baso **Sangqu**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

12-47308 (E) 310812

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Annex

Programme of work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for the period from 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013

The Security Council, in operative paragraph 4 of its resolution 1977 (2011), decided that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) would submit an annual programme of work to the Security Council before the end of each May. The eleventh programme of work of the Committee covers the period from 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013. The Committee has agreed on the following work programme to fulfil its responsibilities under Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011).

The Security Council, in operative paragraph 9 of its resolution 1977 (2011), decided that the Committee should continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004) through its programme of work. This includes the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in addition to States' efforts at outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation; and addresses in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 to 3 of that resolution, which encompasses accountability, physical protection, border controls and law enforcement efforts and national export and trans-shipment controls, including controls on providing funds and services such as financing to such exports and trans-shipments. It also includes, as necessary, specific priorities for its work, taking into account its annual review on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), prepared with the assistance of the group of experts before the end of each December.

The Committee will continue to work with Member States on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), guided by the principles of transparency, equal treatment, cooperation and consistency in its approach.

To implement the eleventh programme of work more efficiently, the Committee will continue to operate a system of four working groups, open to all its members. The working groups will focus on important and recurring issues. In addition, the Committee will publish a schedule for periodic meetings of all four working groups that strives to meet its objectives efficiently and promptly. Such a schedule will include periodic feedback by working groups responsible for monitoring progress on: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001); and transparency and media outreach.

All working group meetings will be open to and announced to all Council delegations. All meetings documents will be circulated to all Council delegations prior to meetings. The work will be organized in a manner that enables all delegations, regardless of size, to participate fully in all their activities. The Committee will promote greater transparency by, where relevant, holding open meetings on those working group outcomes approved by the Committee and by communicating those outcomes to national contact points.

These arrangements for the working groups are detailed in the appendix, which constitutes a portion of the work programme.

The Committee will focus its attention on, but not limit it to, five main areas of work: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001); transparency and media outreach; and administration and resources.

1. Monitoring and national implementation

(a) Prepare a review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) before 31 December 2012, in line with the requirements of operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1977 (2011), and address all aspects of resolution 1540 (2004), in particular all aspects of its operative paragraphs 1 to 3, including the developing and maintaining of efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004) in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law; and also with a view to including, as necessary, specific priorities for its work in the next programme of work;

(b) Continue its efforts to encourage States that have not yet submitted their first reports to do so, including researching publicly available websites of Governments and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to identify legislation and other measures for States that have yet to report and, in an effort to encourage them to prepare and submit their first report, share that information with those States in the form of a matrix;

(c) Continue examining incoming first reports, submissions of additional information from States, researching available websites of Governments and international, regional and subregional organizations, conducting dialogue with States (including during country visits at States' invitation), participate in relevant outreach or implementation activities to gather relevant information on national implementation efforts, make available the findings of these examinations to States in the form of a matrix, along with requests for clarification or for updates on relevant legislation and enforcement measures, and encourage States to strengthen their efforts in regularly sharing information with the Committee to update it on their efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004);

(d) Encourage States, in line with operative paragraphs 7 and 12 of resolution 1977 (2011), to identify and voluntarily report on effective national practices in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) so that they might be used in providing further general and specific guidance, upon request, to States seeking assistance in implementing the resolution;

(e) Under operative paragraph 8 of resolution 1977 (2011), encourage all States to prepare on a voluntary basis national implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit those plans to the 1540 Committee;

(f) With input from the Committee's working groups on monitoring and national implementation, assistance and cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), consider preparing, regularly updating

and making available, as appropriate, a compilation of effective practices in accordance with operative paragraphs 7 and 12 of resolution 1977 (2011);

(g) With input from the Committee's working groups on monitoring and national implementation and assistance, initiate, by requests to States, an update of the legislative database, and encourage States to make appropriate use of the background information provided through it by striving to make it more user-friendly and responsive to interests expressed by States;

(h) Continue to raise awareness of those multilateral treaties and conventions that aim to prevent the proliferation of, or eliminate, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and in the context of paragraph 8 (a) of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), promote the universal adoption, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which States are parties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(i) Continue consideration of the obligations and requirements under resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011) to identify areas for further work by the Committee, such as gathering additional information on implementation measures.

2. Assistance

(a) Collect up-to-date information on requests for or interest in assistance by States and offers of, interest in and programmes of assistance by States and international, regional and subregional organizations, clarifying, as appropriate, whether existing offers have been met, otherwise promote assistance in close consultation with the States concerned, and maintain such information in a regularly updated database;

(b) Conduct more overviews of the requests, offers and related assistance programmes to develop more effective matching strategies;

(c) Conduct country-specific visits, at the invitation of States, to better understand the challenges of national implementation and to better develop tailored strategies to facilitate national implementation and, where appropriate, help States to obtain assistance;

(d) With input from the Committee's working group on assistance, and also from the Committee's working group on cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), where appropriate, continue to organize and participate in outreach activity at the international, regional and subregional levels and, where appropriate, with States, to facilitate coordination of assistance programmes, promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned and effective practices with a view to their inclusion in a compilation in line with 1 (f) above, collect information on requests for, offers of or interest in assistance, and liaise on the availability of programmes that might facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

(e) Encourage and, where appropriate, assist States to integrate their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) obligations into their pursuit of broader national objectives convergent with the resolution;

(f) Implement and continually review current procedures on processing incoming assistance requests and offers of assistance, and provide regular updates on the status of requests and offers to the parties involved;

(g) Provide, upon request, information to Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to help them to make more effective offers of or, for States, more effective requests for assistance, including using the matrix and the assistance template as tools, including the preparation of requests for assistance if asked;

(h) In cases in which States prefer not to post their matrix, seek their consent to share the said matrix, as appropriate, with potential assistance partners;

(i) Consider regional approaches to assistance needs and efforts to meet them, including assistance requests made through regional organizations, or jointly by States members of Customs unions, free trade zones or zones free of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

3. Cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001)

(a) Enhance its cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, and develop ways of operating with those organizations on a case-by-case basis, reflecting the variation in each organization's capacity and mandate, including exchanges at the working level, briefings to and from the Committee, and enhanced information-sharing arrangements;

(b) Expand both formal and informal working relationships with international non-proliferation mechanisms, including zones free of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, other United Nations bodies and international, regional and subregional organizations, where applicable:

(i) To facilitate the sharing of information on effective practices and lessons learned, in addition to templates and guidance, including with a view to their incorporation into the compilation envisaged in 1 (f) above;

(ii) To identify assistance requirements and programmes whereby its work with international, regional and subregional organizations can focus on facilitating the activity of those organizations to remedy national implementation challenges, such as reconciling priorities, harmonizing approaches, facilitating advisory and drafting services, and matching requests and offers of assistance;

(iii) To enhance information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to the Committee and the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), as appropriate;

(c) Under operative paragraph 18 of resolution 1977 (2011), encourage international, regional and subregional organizations to designate and provide a point of contact or coordinator for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by 31 December 2012, and maintain up-to-date information on such contacts;

(d) Continue to participate in the joint briefings to the Security Council.

4. Transparency and media outreach

(a) Increase interaction on a regular basis with all States Members of the United Nations, including, where appropriate, through open meetings as noted in operative paragraph 20 of resolution 1977 (2011), and by regularly updating its website;

(b) Complete the establishment of e-mail distribution lists for contacts of the 1540 Committee;

(c) With input from the working group on monitoring and national implementation, post updated matrices on the website as appropriate;

(d) Publish on the Committee's website the calendar of outreach events and workshops conducted, sponsored or co-sponsored by the Committee or Member States, in addition to information notes on such activities, and update and maintain a list of frequently asked questions about, among other things, the work, membership, Chair, coordinators, group of experts and implementation;

(e) Produce and update regularly, and at least monthly, a calendar of outreach events or similar activities, covering periods of at least six months into the future, that includes information on other activities of relevant States, international, regional and subregional organizations, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and other United Nations bodies;

(f) Encourage States to promote dialogue and cooperation, including with civil society, academia and industry, to address the threat posed by illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials;

(g) Increase efforts to raise awareness among parliamentarians and other high-level decision makers;

(h) In line with operative paragraphs 5 (b) and 22 (d) of resolution 1977 (2011), consider ways to better utilize and maintain expertise, including, in particular, of former experts of the group, that could be made available for specific missions and assistance needs regarding the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);

(i) Continue to brief the Security Council, Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, formally and informally, about the work of the Committee and the obligations and requirements of resolution 1540 (2004).

5. Administration and resources

(a) As required under operative paragraph 22 (a) of resolution 1977 (2011), prepare a report to submit to the Council on the possibility of strengthening the support provided by the Office of Disarmament Affairs to the 1540 Committee, including through the strengthening of the regional capacity of the Office to support the implementation of the resolution at the regional, subregional and national levels;

(b) Continue to conduct regular meetings of the Committee and its working groups and, as necessary, additional meetings with relevant parties to further the mandate of resolution 1540 (2004), including meetings that might include participation from capitals on topics of high priority;

(c) Encourage States and international, regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, to provide support to the work of the Committee and its programmes;

(d) Continue to encourage and take full advantage of voluntary financial contributions to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and, at the Committee's discretion, promote the efficient and effective use of the existing funding mechanisms within the United Nations system;

(e) Continue its efforts to ease the transition of new non-permanent members to the Committee, including by making relevant documentation available and providing appropriate briefings, and maintain the network of non-permanent members leaving the Committee to support the implementation of the resolution.

Appendix

Arrangements for a system of working groups to support the eleventh programme of work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

1. *Monitoring and national implementation*

This working group will monitor progress on part 1 of the eleventh programme of work, including follow-up work on the comprehensive review and overseeing the status of implementation:

- Explore and execute more effective ways of obtaining missing information
- Make any recommendations deemed necessary for the revision of matrices
- Assume the responsibilities and authorities of the three subcommittees, which shall not meet for the period of this programme of work
- Consider what methodologies might be appropriate to produce quantitative measures of success within the terms of resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), and 1977 (2011)
- Report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) after each meeting

2. *Assistance*

This working group will monitor progress on part 2 of the eleventh programme of work, including the following:

- Organize work, as appropriate, at the regional and subregional levels to help to achieve these objectives
- Process incoming assistance requests in the light of the enhanced clearing-house role of the Committee, which now includes matching requests with offers
- Recommend shared experiences to enhance coordination among States offering or considering offering assistance
- Report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) after each meeting
- By 31 December 2012, submit a report to the Committee on what has been accomplished, what has worked and what has not worked

3. *Cooperation with international organizations, including the Security Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001)*

This working group will monitor progress on part 3 of the eleventh programme of work, including the following:

- Lead work with the other Committees, their experts and monitoring teams to expand the common strategy on reporting

- Work with the other committees, their experts and monitoring teams to develop a more coordinated approach to subregional workshops, in line with paragraph 36 of resolution 1822 (2008), and within respective mandates
- Report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) after each meeting

4. *Transparency and media outreach*

This working group will monitor progress on part 4 of the eleventh programme of work, including the following:

- Consider and seize opportunities for industry and media outreach that would complement and support the work of States, which, by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1540 (2004), are called upon "to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws"
- Consider and seize opportunities, as appropriate, for direct interaction with relevant industries and industry groups, academia and civil society
- Identify opportunities to highlight the threat of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors
- Report to the Committee after each meeting

Each working group will be chaired by a member of the Committee, supported by the Committee's secretariat and the Committee's group of experts.

United Nations S/2012/664

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 August 2012
English
Original: French

Letter dated 17 August 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached letter dated 3 August 2012 from Mr. Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (see annex).

Mr. Jallow's letter is in response to the letter of 27 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations, concerning Zimbabwe's cooperation in the search for one of the high-level ICTR fugitives, Mr. Protais Mpiranya (S/2012/497).

I would be grateful if you would bring the letter from Mr. Jallow to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

12-47182 (E) 280812 280812

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Annex

[Original: English]

Letter dated 3 August 2012 from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the Secretary-General

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda fugitive Protais Mpiranya and cooperation by Zimbabwe

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 27 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council (S/2012/497), a copy whereof has been forwarded to my office through the Office of Legal Affairs.

1. I welcome the affirmation of the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe in his letter that "Zimbabwe fully understands that cooperation with any Tribunal is an international legal obligation for all Member States of the United Nations" and his assurance of the willingness of Zimbabwe to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism in this matter.

2. Investigators and tracking teams of the Office of the Prosecutor have been investigating Protais Mpiranya, a top level indictee of the Tribunal, since 1994. Investigations reveal that after leaving Rwanda, the fugitive fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and from there to Harare, where he has been residing at various times since 2002. Evidence suggests that the fugitive has strong links with high-level military and civilian personnel in Zimbabwe.

3. After appropriate contact with INTERPOL and Zimbabwean police authorities, I dispatched the heads of the investigation and tracking teams in my office to Harare to consult with Zimbabwean authorities, sensitize them on the presence of Protais Mpiranya in the country and request the establishment of a dedicated team of Zimbabwean police officers assigned to investigate, search for and arrest the fugitive. A dedicated team of Zimbabwean police was established in 2008 pursuant to the request of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to closely work together with Tribunal investigators in the tracking and arrest of the fugitive.

4. However, soon thereafter the team was unilaterally dismantled by the Zimbabwean authorities and cooperation and communication between the investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor and the Zimbabwean police team broke down. Staff from the Office of the Prosecutor travelled to Harare on several occasions to seek to re-establish contact without success.

5. In September 2009, I personally led a mission to Harare where, after discussions with the Joint Ministers for Home Affairs, the Minister for Justice and other senior Government officials in the police and the army, it was agreed to re-establish a joint task force between Zimbabwean police and Tribunal investigators to track and arrest the fugitive Protais Mpiranya. The Government also appointed a senior official as the focal point for cooperation between the Zimbabwean Government and the Tribunal.

6. Unfortunately, any subsequent cooperation pursuant to the Government's assurances given to me proved unhelpful. Office of the Prosecutor investigators undertook several missions to Harare to work with the joint task force but immediately ran into numerous hurdles. They were not provided the necessary clearances to meet with the authorities, the Ministry of Home Affairs focal point left and was not replaced and police assigned to the joint task force did not share the agreed written reports of their investigations with their Tribunal counterparts, among others. It was clear that every time Tribunal investigators left Harare after their mission, the Zimbabwean police also stopped its investigations of the leads provided by the Tribunal.

7. Tribunal investigators were also not allowed to accompany the police for joint verification or investigation even when the information had been provided to them by Tribunal investigators and feedback in any form from the public and other authorities has been rare.

8. There have always been substantial delays in granting clearances from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe for Tribunal investigators to conduct activities in Zimbabwe, despite adequate notice provided in good time.

9. Zimbabwean authorities have failed, despite several requests, to provide access for Tribunal investigators to interview certain specific persons known or suspected to have some relationship with the fugitive.

Despite the many instances of a lack of cooperation by the Zimbabwean authorities, I have, in response to the further assurances contained in the letter of its Permanent Representative under reference, once again written to the Government of Zimbabwe welcoming its assurances of cooperation and have requested to visit Harare from 10 to 12 September 2012 for consultations on the way forward. A response is awaited.

I would appreciate it if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hassan B. **Jallow**
Chief Prosecutor
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and International Residual Mechanism

United Nations A/66/893–S/2012/665

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda items 35, 39, 67 and 83

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 23 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for June 2012 (see annex). According to the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire on both military and civilian objects in Azerbaijan from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia. On 5 June 2012, the armed forces of Armenia made an incursion into the bordering Gazakh district of Azerbaijan, as a result of which five Azerbaijani servicemen lost their lives. The international community vigorously reacted to that provocative action, demanding a stop to the violence and reiterating that the conflict cannot be resolved by the use of force.

I would also like to refer to the recent letters circulated by the Permanent Representative of Armenia (A/66/825-S/2012/428 and A/66/871-S/2012/559), the content of which is nothing other than yet another example of blatant falsification, so characteristic of this Member State's propaganda methods.

It is notable that, while making selective and out-of-context references to statements by international partners on the importance of the principle of the non-use of force, Armenian officials misinterpret this principle as allegedly having the purpose to freeze the military results of this country's illegal use of force against Azerbaijan. It is well known, however, that, in circumstances in which one State has

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neglected its obligation to settle the international dispute by peaceful means and thereafter has illegally used force to occupy the territory of another State, claims that the victim State is under an obligation to respect the principle of the non-use of force vis-à-vis the aggressor State are redundant. Needless to say, if sustained, such claims will inevitably play into the hands of an aggressor, tend to entrench positions of control achieved as a result of the illegal use of force, reinforce the perceptions of the centrality of military strength in international relations and encourage impunity rather than contribute to the triumph of justice.

The principle of the non-use of force, which has been flagrantly violated by Armenia, must be carried into effect by the complete withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the Daghlyq Garabagh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the restoration of Azerbaijani sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and the reaffirmation of this principle in inter-State relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the settlement of the conflict. It is also essential to reiterate that Armenia is obliged under international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions to put an end to its illegal occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and, consequently, the implementation of that obligation can in no way be introduced as a compromise and used as a bargaining chip in the conflict settlement process.

By claiming that Azerbaijan is allegedly continuing to reject the implementation of confidence-building measures, including the proposal on the withdrawal of snipers from the front line and the agreement to set up a mechanism for the investigation of accidents along the same line, the Armenian propaganda falls into its usual forgetfulness. Otherwise, the officials of that country would recollect their non-compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, which, inter alia, demanded immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, as well as their non-compliance with numerous documents and decisions of other international organizations calling for an end to the occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

Additionally, Armenia deliberately denies the right of more than 1 million Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes, and undertakes efforts to alter the demographic balance in the occupied territories and remove any signs of their Azerbaijani cultural and historical roots. Armenia's speculations on confidence-building are also curious insofar as it persistently opposes direct contact between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of Daghlyq Garabagh. Likewise, the undisguised promotion by the leadership of Armenia of the odious ideas of racial superiority, ethnic and religious incompatibility and hatred towards Azerbaijan and other neighbouring nations can hardly contribute to building confidence.

Furthermore, as we have repeatedly stated in our earlier communications and as can be seen from the information attached to the present letter, regular ceasefire violations and deliberate attacks by the armed forces of Armenia against both Azerbaijani military personnel and civilians along the front line and the border between the two States have become more frequent and violent in recent times, resulting in the killing and maiming of many people. It is also notable that, on a number of occasions, such attacks and other provocative actions coincided with the intensification of peace efforts.

The above-mentioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Armenia once again contain comments on the military budget increase of Azerbaijan. It is, however, well known that the annual defence spending of Azerbaijan remains in line with its overall budget increases, that Azerbaijan continues to spend a much smaller percentage of its gross domestic product on its army than Armenia and that the size of the armed forces of Azerbaijan is proportional to its population, territory and length of borders and remains less than that of Armenia. Indeed, comparative analyses show that in correlation to its population, territory, annual budget and gross domestic product, Armenia is the most militarized country of the South Caucasus in terms of military expenditures, foreign military assistance, military personnel and quantity of procured armaments.

Moreover, in gross violation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to which it is a party, Armenia continues building up its military presence in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and has deployed there more than 40 well-equipped combat units with up to 350 battle tanks, 398 armoured combat vehicles, 425 artillery systems (calibre 100 mm and above) and about 45,000 military personnel. The total number of declared and undeclared Treaty-limited equipment and military personnel of Armenia both in the territory of Armenia and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan amounts to 481 battle tanks, 599 armoured combat vehicles, 718 artillery systems and 91,804 military personnel. At the same time, it should be taken into account that, in accordance with the Treaty, Armenia is allowed to hold on its territory only 220 battle tanks, 220 armoured combat vehicles and 285 artillery systems, whereas under the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the armed forces of Armenia can have only up to 60,000 personnel. These figures give a clear picture regarding the extent to which Armenia has exceeded its allowed limit under the Treaty.

The conclusion here is obvious: the behaviour of Armenia definitely contributes to deepening mistrust and making the prospect of a speedy negotiated settlement elusive. It is obvious that the content of all statements and communications from the Government of Armenia is illustrative of its uninterrupted attempts to create a wrong impression of the real situation on the ground and to deflect the attention of the international community from the urgent need to address the main problems caused by this Member State's continuing aggression. Azerbaijan is confident that the achievement of peace, security, stability and confidence is possible, first and foremost, only by removing the consequences of the illegal use of force by Armenia, thus ensuring that the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan is ended and that the rights of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons to return to their homes and to their property and possessions are guaranteed and implemented.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 39, 67 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tofig **Musayev**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the letter dated 23 August 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for June 2012

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1.	1 June	01.45-02.00	The area near Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	The area near Gizil Hajili village, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	–
2.	1 June	03.30-03.40	Occupied unnamed heights, Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
3.	1 June	10.45-11.05	Occupied area, Goyarkh, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
4.	1 June	13.25-13.35	The area near Chinarli village, Berd district, Armenia	The area near Kokhanabi village, Tovuz district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	–
5.	2 June	01.35-01.40	Occupied area near Horadiz village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
6.	4 June	00.50-01.05	Occupied area near Goyarkh village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
7.	4 June	16.00-16.20 23.40-23.50	Occupied unnamed heights and the area near Tapgaragoyunlu village, Geranboy district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to fire point areas.

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
8.	4 June	23.20-23.30 23.35-23.40	Occupied unnamed heights and areas near Ashaghy Veyselli, Garakhanbeyli, Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly, Gorgan and Ashaghy Seyidahmedli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
9.	5 June	00.20-00.30 02.45-02.50 02.55-03.10 05.10-05.15	Occupied unnamed heights and areas near Ashaghy Veyselli, Garakhanbeyli, Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly, Gorgan and Ashaghy Seyidahmedli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
10.	5 June	02.55-03.10 06.30	From their positions on the territory of Armenia, that country's armed forces made an incursion into the territory of Azerbaijan and opened fire on the positions of the armed forces of Azerbaijan in Gazakh district situated on the border between the two countries	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm and machine gun	Five soldiers of the armed forces of Azerbaijan, Zulfugar Atashli, Amil Aliyev, Vahid Bahirov, Khalid Azizov and Elchin Ismayilov, were killed
11.	5 June	03.00-03.10	Occupied unnamed heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
12.	5 June	03.10-03.20	Occupied area near Mehdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
13.	5 June	05.00-05.20	Occupied area near Javahirli and Yusifjanly villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
14.	5-6 June	At different times from 18.00 on 5 June to 08.00 on 6 June	Along the front line from positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and along the border from the territory of Armenia	Adjacent areas in various directions	Firearm and machine gun	–
15.	6 June	At different times	Along the front line from positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and along the border from the territory of Armenia	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
16.	7-8 June	At different times from 20.00 on 7 June to 08.00 on 8 June	Occupied area, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
17.	8 June	12.00-12.30	Occupied areas, Ortag Gyshlag, Ortag Garvand, Bash Garvand and Farzali villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
18.	8-9 June	At different times from 20.00 on 8 June to 08.00 on 9 June	Along the front line from positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and along the border from the territory of Armenia	Adjacent areas in various directions	Firearm and machine gun	–
19.	10-11 June	At different times from 20.00 on 10 June to 08.00 on 11 June	Along the front line from positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and along the border from the territory of Armenia	Adjacent areas in various directions	Firearm and machine gun	–
20.	11-12 June	At different times from 20.00 on 11 June to 08.00 on 12 June	Along the front line from positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and along the border from the territory of Armenia	Adjacent areas in various directions	Firearm and machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
21.	12-13 June	At different times from 08.00 on 12 June to 08.00 on 13 June	Occupied areas near Gizil Oba, Goyarkh and Seysulan villages, Tar-Tar district; Tapgaragoyunlu village, Geranboy district; Merzili, Shurabad and Yusifjanly villages, Aghdam district; Horadiz, Gorgan, Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly, Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Ashaghy Veyselli villages, Fizuli district; Mehdili village, Jabrayil district; and unnamed heights near Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
22.	13-14 June	At different times from 08.00 on 13 June to 08.00 on 14 June	Occupied areas near Aghdam, Geranboy, Fizuli and Khojavand districts, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
23.	15-16 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Merzili village, Aghdam district; Tapgaragoyunlu village, Geranboy district; Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly village, Fizuli district; Chilyabert village, Tar-Tar district; and Mehdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
24.	17-18 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Shykhlar, Merzili and Yusifjanly villages, Aghdam district; Goyarkh village, Tar-Tar district; and Tapgaragoyunlu village, Geranboy district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
25.	18-19 June	At different times	The area near Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia, and occupied areas near Yusifjanly village, Aghdam district; Gorgan, Ashaghy Veyselli, Horadiz, Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Garakhanbeyli villages, Fizuli district; Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district; and Tapgaragoyunlu village, Geranboy district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
26.	19-20 June	At different times	Areas near Berkaber village, Ijevan district, and Bakeramavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia, and occupied areas near Mehdili village, Jabrayil district; Goyarkh and Gizil Oba villages, Tar-Tar district; Gulustan village, Geranboy district; Ashaghy Veyselli and Garakhanbeyli villages, Fizuli district; and Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
27.	20-21 June	At different times	The area near Voskevan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia, and occupied areas near Shykhlar and Kengerli villages, Aghdam district, and Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly and Gorgan villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
28.	21-22 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Tapgaragoyunlu village, Geranboy district; Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly, Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Gorgan villages, Fizuli district; Gizil Oba village, Tar-Tar district; and Mehdili village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
29.	23 June	At different times	The area near Berdavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia, and occupied areas near Garakhanbeyli, Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly and Ashaghy Seyidahmedli villages, Fizuli district; Yusifjanly and Merzili villages, Aghdam district; unnamed heights near Gizil Oba and Goyarkh villages, Tar-Tar district; and Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
30.	24-25 June	At different times	The area near Barekamavan village, Noyemberyan district, Armenia, and occupied areas near Yusifjanly, Shykhlar, Javahirli and Bash Garvand villages, Aghdam district; Goyarkh village, Tar-Tar district; and unnamed heights near Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas		–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
31.	26-27 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Shykhlar, Javahirli, Shirvanly and Kengerli villages, Aghdam district; Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district; and unnamed heights near Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
32.	26-27 June	At different times	Areas near Barekamavan and Berdavan villages, Noyemberyan district; Berkaber village, Ijevan district; and unnamed heights in Berd district, Armenia	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
33.	27 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Javahirli, Bash Garvand and Shurabad villages, Aghdam district; Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly village, Fizuli district; Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district; and unnamed heights near Jabrayil and Dashkesen districts, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–
34.	27-28 June	At different times	The area near Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
35.	27-28 June	In the morning hours	Occupied areas near Javahirli, Bash Garvand and Shurabad villages, Aghdam district; Ashaghy Abdulrahmanly village, Fizuli district; Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district; and unnamed heights near Jabrayil and Dashkesen districts, Azerbaijan	Adjacent areas	Firearm and machine gun	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Fire point area*	*Direction*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
36.	28-29 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Javahirli and Shykhlar villages, Aghdam district; Horadiz village, Fizuli district; Yarimja and Namirli villages, Tar-Tar district; and unnamed heights, Khojavand and Dashkesen districts, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–
37.	29-30 June	At different times	Occupied areas near Ashaghy Seyidahmedli village, Fizuli district; and Seysulan village, Tar-Tar district, Azerbaijan	Adjacent area	Firearm and machine gun	–

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Security Council

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Letter dated 23 August 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to the request of the Security Council in paragraph 21 of its resolution 2036 (2012), concerning the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report that I received from Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 3 August 2012 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

Pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), in which the African Union was requested to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), I am pleased to forward herewith the third African Union Commission progress report on AMISOM (see enclosure).

The report provides an update on the main political and security developments during the period under review. It also covers the deployment of AMISOM and related command and control issues, as well as the Mission and overall African Union efforts in support of the ongoing processes in Somalia. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.

I would be most grateful if you could kindly forward the report to the Security Council members, for their information and action as may be required. The Commission, as always, stands ready to provide any additional information that may be necessary.

I would like, once again, to reiterate the African Union's appreciation to the Security Council and to yourself, for the invaluable support being rendered to AMISOM and the commitment of the United Nations to the promotion of lasting peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Jean **Ping**

Enclosure

Third progress report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012)

[Original: English]

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012). In that resolution, the Council requested the African Union to keep it regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and progress made with regard to establishing an AMISOM presence in the four Sectors set out in the Mission's Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012; increasing the force strength of AMISOM from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, composed of troops and personnel of formed police units; as well as enhancing the effectiveness of the Somali National Security Forces. In compliance with this request, I have already submitted two progress reports to the Council, on 20 March (see S/2012/176, enclosure) and 1 June 2012 (see S/2012/468, enclosure), respectively.

2. This third progress report provides an update on the main political and security developments during the period under review. It also covers the deployment of AMISOM and related command and control issues, as well as the Mission and African Union overall efforts in support of the ongoing processes in Somalia. The report concludes with observations on the way forward.

II. Key political developments

3. My previous report was submitted against the backdrop of significant progress in the political process. In this respect, the Council will recall that, at the meeting of the principal signatories of the political road map, held in Addis Ababa from 21 to 23 May 2012, a number of steps were agreed upon to expedite the completion of the transition. These included the adoption, by 20 July, of the provisional Somali Constitution by the National Constituent Assembly; the selection of the new Somali Parliament on 25 July; the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers of the Parliament on 4 August; and the election of the President, on 20 August. Consequently, at its nineteenth ordinary session, held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 16 July, the Assembly of the African Union expressed satisfaction at the progress made in the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia. It urged the Somali stakeholders to pursue and intensify their efforts, in order to effectively conclude the transition on 20 August, as scheduled. At the same time, the Assembly reiterated the African Union's determination to take measures against all those whose actions are undermining the peace and reconciliation process.

4. During the reporting period, the Somali stakeholders made further progress in addressing the outstanding transitional tasks. Following weeks of deliberations in Mogadishu, the 135 traditional elders drawn from across Somalia nominated, from

their respective clans, the 825 members of the National Constituent Assembly. On 25 July, the Assembly convened in Mogadishu to discuss the provisional Constitution. On 1 August, it adopted the new constitution, which will replace the eight-year-old Transitional Federal Charter. Undoubtedly, this is a milestone in the efforts to usher in a new political dispensation for Somalia in August. The next steps will include the formation of a new Parliament with 275 members which will, in turn, elect its Speaker and Deputy Speakers on 6 August and the President on 20 August. There is a significant possibility that some of the timelines may not be met owing to delays in submitting the list of the selected future legislators to the Technical Selection Committee, for vetting purposes.

5. Throughout the period under consideration, my Special Representative for Somalia, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, remained actively engaged with the signatories of the political road map and other Somali stakeholders, working in partnership with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation. Furthermore, pursuant to its mandate, AMISOM took steps to facilitate the conference of the elders by securing the venue of the National Constituent Assembly, and participated as an international observer in the Technical Selection Committee.

III. Security situation

6. The overall security situation across south central Somalia continued to improve, in the past two months, owing to the multi-pronged operations carried out by the National Security Forces and their allies, with the support of AMISOM and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces. While the efforts made significantly weakened Al-Shabaab, the group nonetheless retains the ability to strike, as demonstrated by the ever-persistent threat of improvised explosive devices, assassinations and suicide attacks. It also continues to receive some support, including funds and ammunition, from the areas it still controls and from elements in the diaspora and certain foreign networks.

7. As indicated in my previous progress report, owing to pressure from AMISOM and allies, and also as a tactic to preserve its resources for a long terror campaign, Al-Shabaab is now withdrawing from the major cities and going underground by melting into clans and establishing new hideouts. In recent months, as a result of the pressure exerted on it in south central Somalia, Al-Shabaab has attempted to establish new bases in the northern Golis Mountains, an ideal hideout with its caves, forested areas and access to the coast, and in some parts of the Togdheer region, in Somaliland. I am concerned about this situation, especially as the number of terrorist elements in the Golis Mountains is likely to grow, owing to infiltration from south central Somalia and access through the coast from Yemen. This includes Somalis radicalized in Yemen who are disguised as returnees to Puntland.

8. In Sector 1 (Lower and Middle Shabelle), following the capture of the strategic town of Afgoye and of the Afgoye corridor, which hosts a large number of internally displaced persons, the Somali and AMISOM forces secured the Esaley airstrip and the Elma'an port, both over 37 kms north-east of Mogadishu. On 26 June, they took control of the strategic northern town of Balaad. The Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM troops are now gradually expanding towards Jowhar,

Marka and Baraawe. It is important to note that there has been an increase in the number of ambushes against AMISOM convoys in this Sector, particularly along the Afgoye road, owing to stretched lines of communication. There are also strong indications that Al-Shabaab is planning to step up attacks along AMISOM supply routes.

9. In Sector 2 (Lower and Middle Juba), AMISOM and the Somali allied forces control most of Lower Juba. This covers Afmadow, Badhaade, Burgabo, Dobley, Hayo, Kolbio, Kuday, Qoqani, Ras Kamboni and Tabta. Following the capture of Afmadow, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM are consolidating their control of the liberated areas, which continue to witness sporadic attacks by Al-Shabaab elements. The following major towns are still in the hands of Al-Shabaab: Bibi, Bu'aale, Jamaa, Jilib and Kismayo. At the time of writing, preparations were under way to expand military operations to these areas.

10. In Sector 3 (Gedo, Bay and Bakool), there were significant advances by the Somali forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces. As indicated in my previous report, almost all of Gedo, Bay and Bakool have been liberated, with the exception of the Dinsor district, in Bay, and Tayeeglow district and some parts of Wajid, in the Bakool region. Recently, Al-Shabaab attempted to infiltrate small cells in liberated towns, to carry out assassinations and attacks with improvised explosive devices and grenades.

11. In Sector 4 (Galgadud and Hiraan), the situation remains tense in Beletweyne, owing to long-simmering tensions among the Hawiye subclans of the Hawadle and Galjel clans. Although Al-Shabaab has been pushed out of the city, some of its elements remain concentrated around Bulo-Burte and continue to take advantage of the disputes among the various clans.

12. While progress continues to be made on the ground, disciplinary issues among the Somali forces still pose a serious challenge. Thefts and shoot-outs among Somali soldiers are becoming more frequent; AMISOM is working with the National Security Forces to improve discipline within its ranks. There are also an estimated 3,000 disengaged former combatants (combatants who demobilize, renounce violent opposition to the Government and seek a return to civilian life), but there are no resources available to cater for their needs. Some of the middle-level Al-Shabaab commanders who have surrendered are considered to be at high risk of reprisals. AMISOM continues consultations with relevant stakeholders to build consensus on how best to address this issue.

IV. Deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia

13. The period under review was marked by significant progress in the deployment of AMISOM and the establishment of its presence in other Sectors outside Mogadishu. At the time of writing, the total number of AMISOM uniformed personnel stood at 17,194, including 91 individual police officers and the recently deployed formed police units from Uganda.

14. The redeployment of 1,000 Burundi troops from Mogadishu to Baidoa started on 23 July and is expected to be completed by 6 August. These troops will join the 120 military personnel from Uganda and Burundi deployed in Sector 3 since April 2012 as an advance party. This operation is not without its logistical challenges.

Nevertheless, commendable effort was made jointly by AMISOM and the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) to ensure that the major equipment and initial sustainment package are in place and that the expanded support package will continue to be delivered as the security situation allows. Steps are being taken to redeploy 1,500 Ugandan troops from Mogadishu to Sector 3.

15. I am pleased to note that UNSOA has completed the pre-positioning of essential equipment for Sector 3 by road, via Kenya and Ethiopia. The third convoy transporting major equipment, rations, tents and general supplies arrived at the Ethiopian border town of Dollow in mid-June, before reaching Baidoa on 9 July. UNSOA has also secured additional commercial cargo aircraft to increase its capability to deliver supplies by air into Baidoa and Beletweyne. These aircraft have already delivered water purification and air traffic control equipment, tents, fuel and other essential supply items to the advance team in Baidoa. UNSOA has installed facilities in Baidoa for a Sector headquarters, a level I hospital and a communications system. It is also taking the necessary steps regarding the provision of medical equipment, drugs and consumables, so that the planned medical facility can be operationalized as soon as possible. In the interim, logistical support arrangements for Sectors 3 and 4 are being formalized through a letter of assist between the United Nations and the Government of Ethiopia, which is expected to provide security, engineering and transportation support in the two Sectors.

16. On 2 June, the African Union Commission and the Government of Kenya signed a memorandum of understanding governing Kenya's military personnel contribution to AMISOM, whose strength is 4,660. In the memorandum of understanding, it was specified that the date of entry into force would be 22 February 2012, when the Security Council adopted resolution 2036 (2012), for the purposes of reimbursement for personnel and contingent-owned equipment. On 6 July, my Special Representative for Somalia presided over a rehatting ceremony at the Kenya Defence Forces headquarters in Nairobi, in order to symbolically welcome the Kenya Defence Forces contingent into the AMISOM family. The Kenya Defence Forces conducted a rotation of troops at the end of June. From 28 June to 14 July, and as per AMISOM procedures, the African Union and UNSOA carried out a verification exercise of the incoming troops and electronically collected the personnel data of each peacekeeper. A second phase is planned to verify the number of troops that will rotate out of the Mission area when the relief of the outgoing troops is completed.

17. On 13 July, in Addis Ababa, the Commission and the Government of Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding governing the 1,000 strength Djiboutian contribution to AMISOM. As the Security Council is aware, a platoon-size advance element (35 military personnel) was deployed in Beletweyne, on 31 May. The deployment of the main body of the contingent to Sector 4 (Beletweyne), which should have been completed in mid-June, will be finalized soon.

18. The African Union and UNSOA, in consultation with the troop-contributing countries, have prepared letters of assist regarding the deployment of air assets. A letter of assist with the Government of Uganda was signed on 2 August, but the one with the Government of Kenya has yet to be signed. Pending the signature of the letter of assist with the Government of Uganda, a letter of intent relating to the deployment of three attack and two utility helicopters was drawn up. The process

for the deployment of these helicopters is under way; the advance party of air personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 2 August. The deployment should be completed by mid-August, including the construction of a heliport and other necessary facilities. The deployment of these force enablers is critical for operational as well as logistical support, specifically medical evacuation. I welcome the decision by the Security Council, in response to the letters I sent to the Secretary-General, on 25 June and 6 July, to authorize some flexibility in the configuration of attack and utility helicopters, in support of AMISOM operations.

19. Regarding the police component of AMISOM, 91 individual police officers have been deployed in Mogadishu. This is expected to increase to 180 by the end of September, while the full strength of 260 individual police officers provided for in the Strategic Concept will be reached in November. A total of 813 individual police officers, who were assessed and selected in the five AMISOM police-contributing countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda), have been rostered for future deployment to Somalia. The police roll-out plan to Sectors 2, 3 and 4 has been developed, and a technical assessment mission has already been conducted in Sector 2, in Baidoa. During the period under review, the AMISOM police component undertook a number of activities, including refurbishing some buildings of the Somali Police Force; assisting the Somali Police Force in establishing a Joint Operations Coordinating Centre at its headquarters, which will be operated by AMISOM and Somali police officers on a 24-hour basis to coordinate joint patrols in Mogadishu; deploying a team site at the Aden Abdulle International Airport; and various training activities, in particular the organization of a gender-based violence workshop in June, following which a gender unit was established within the Somali Police Force.

20. The Strategic Concept provides for the deployment of two formed police units. In this respect, and following verification exercises, the Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with Uganda on 29 June. The personnel and equipment of the Uganda formed police unit were fully deployed in Mogadishu on 2 August. This marks the first ever deployment of a formed police unit in an African Union-led peace support operation. The draft memorandum of understanding with Nigeria has been finalized and is expected to be signed shortly, while the actual deployment in Mogadishu is planned for the first week of September. Additional offers of formed police units have been received from the Governments of Burundi and Djibouti. The deployment of the formed police units is expected to enhance police visibility and interface with the ordinary Somali population, bolster public order and security, and reassure communities through robust joint patrols conducted by the formed police units, the individual police officers and the Somali Police Force in Mogadishu. The formed police units will also facilitate the enhancement of institutional capacity-building activities carried out by the AMISOM police component in support of the Somali Police Force, as well as the expansion of its operations to other liberated areas.

21. Lastly, with regard to the establishment of the Guard Force, the AMISOM Force Commander is working towards putting in place temporary arrangements. More specifically, the objective is to establish a unit to undertake the guard duties, pending the proper generation and full deployment, with the requisite equipment, of a designated unit, which will be part of AMISOM authorized strength and under the authority of the Force Commander.

V. Command and control

22. As previously reported, the Strategic Concept provides for the establishment of an effective command and control architecture at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, there are two advisory structures assisting the Commission: (a) the Military Operations Coordination Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the troop-contributing countries and other interested countries, which held its inaugural meeting in Addis Ababa on 9 March; and (b) the Joint Coordination Mechanism, comprising the Ministers of Defence of the troop-contributing countries and other interested countries, which held its inaugural meeting in Addis Ababa, on 12 April. To date, the Military Operations Coordination Committee has met five times. The plan for future operations was discussed at the 4th and 5th meetings, held in Addis Ababa, on 23 July and 2 August.

23. Following the approval of the command and control architecture for the expanded AMISOM operations and the allocation of posts for the Force headquarters among the troop-contributing countries and other African Union member States, 52 of the 85 staff officers, the Force Commander, the Deputy Force Commander for Plans and Operations and the Chief of Staff assumed their posts at the Force headquarters. An additional group of 18 staff officers were recently selected and will be deployed shortly. All Sector Commanders have been deployed, with the exception of the Commander of Sector 4, who will be in place once the deployment of the Djiboutian contingent is completed.

24. In addition, AMISOM and UNSOA have established a coordination mechanism to enhance the provision of the expanded support package to AMISOM. To that end, a joint task force comprising AMISOM and UNSOA officers meets weekly to follow up on pressing issues, and a senior management meeting, co-chaired by my Special Representative and the Director of UNSOA, is conducted on a monthly basis. These meetings are also supplemented by regular video teleconferences among Addis Ababa, Mogadishu and Nairobi.

VI. Protection of civilians

25. Efforts continue to be exerted to mainstream the protection of civilians into AMISOM operations and to strengthen coordination with the Somali authorities and other relevant civilian protection actors operating in southern Somalia. From 20 to 23 June, the Commission hosted a workshop on mainstreaming protection of civilians into AMISOM operations. The meeting assessed the progress made to date, based on current and new protection risks. It also outlined the best ways and means through which the Mission can coordinate its efforts with other actors, with a view to reducing the threat posed to the civilian population.

26. The Commission continued to work towards the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell, as outlined in Security Council resolution 2036 (2012). To that end, discussions are under way with all key stakeholders, building on the outcome of the scoping mission undertaken by a team from the non-governmental organization Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) to Mogadishu, from 17 to 21 April. It should be recalled that, following that mission, recommendations were made regarding the preliminary framework for the establishment of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell. The team is planning to undertake another mission to Mogadishu, in September 2012.

VII. Support to the Somali security sector

27. It should be recalled that the Commission organized a series of workshops on the empowerment of the Somali security sector that led to the development of a concept of operations for the mechanisms to be put in place, in order to facilitate the effective integration of the regional and allied forces into the Somali National Security Forces and the establishment of a unified command and control architecture. Following its endorsement by the Somali authorities, the document will now be submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council, before transmission to the Security Council. It is my expectation that the international community will provide the requested support, for it is critical to the achievements of sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

28. Urgent international support is needed since the Somali forces have no dedicated logistical support, but instead rely mostly on assistance provided by the Kenya Defence Forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces. They do not have the capacity to sustain their deployed units. Critical needs in this respect include transport, repair and maintenance, food and water, light arms and ammunition, field accommodation, communications and pay (stipend). The Somali authorities are appealing for $127,180,550 (combat supplies, rations, stipends and logistics) to meet their immediate requirements for a 12-month period.

VIII. Other aspects of African Union support to Somalia

29. As the Security Council is aware, the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains a concern. At least 2.51 million people are in urgent need of aid and an additional 1.29 million are at risk of sliding back into crisis. The situation in the newly liberated areas requires the involvement of all the humanitarian actors. I urge the international community to step up its efforts to address the challenges at hand. On its part, AMISOM, within the available resources, is engaged in the implementation of quick-impact projects, such as the drilling of water wells, the treatment of the wounded and demining activities, in the newly liberated areas.

30. The livestock sector is the backbone of the livelihoods of the Somali people and is a source of revenue for local and central administrations. It generates 40 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 per cent of the country's foreign currency earnings. However, the sector is faced with many challenges that limit the potential socioeconomic benefits. These include insecurity, livestock diseases and drought, inability to comply with international standards that would sustain the safe export of livestock and livestock products, and inadequate human and infrastructural capacity. Sustainable livestock production and trade are critical components for economic recovery and a return to peace and stability in Somalia. Accordingly, since 2008, the African Union, through the Nairobi-based African Union-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources, which operates in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and some international non-governmental organizations, has carried out a number of interventions to support the livestock sector in Somalia, with financial support from the European Union.

31. Through the project "Livestock emergency intervention to mitigate the food crisis in Somalia", the African Union-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources

significantly contributed to an improvement in livestock marketing infrastructure facilities along the key livestock export marketing chain. A total of 134 livestock marketing structures comprising loading/off-loading ramps (53), market sheds (45), vaccination crushes (17), veterinary offices (3) and water troughs (16) were constructed. The project also contributed to improved disease control through the vaccination of 4.8 million sheep and goats against three major diseases and the treatment of 1.8 million animals for common diseases affecting the export trade in livestock.

32. To support compliance with international standards for livestock export, the African Union-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources implemented the Somali livestock certification project, through which 156 technical personnel were trained in skills necessary for quality assurance of livestock export trade. Support was also provided for routine animal health certification activities and the rehabilitation of animal health certification offices in Garowe, Las Geel and Mogadishu. In addition, a risk-based animal health certification system that combines market and quarantine inspection and certification was developed and endorsed by trading partners. More generally, the African Union-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources also facilitated the establishment of closer linkages between value chain actors from livestock exporting countries in the Horn of Africa (including Somalia) and those from the livestock importing countries in the Gulf Region. Lastly, the African Union-Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources supports the participation of Somalia in processes relating to the establishment of animal health standards at the World Organization for Animal Health.

IX. Observations

33. The reporting period witnessed significant progress on all tracks. The convening of the elders' conference and the National Constituent Assembly, particularly the adoption of the provisional Constitution, are important steps towards the achievement of the objectives of the transition. The overall security situation continues to improve, as AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government gradually expand their control to areas outside Mogadishu. Significant progress was also made towards the achievement of key operational benchmarks relating to AMISOM deployment and presence in the various Sectors. Lastly, while the Guard Force is yet to be formally established, interim arrangements were made to provide guard duties within existing resources and capabilities. However, a number of challenges remain at the political, security, operational and peace consolidation levels.

34. As I submit this report, fewer than three weeks remain before the conclusion of the transitional period. The weeks ahead present an unprecedented opportunity for Somalia. The Somali people must seize this unique window of opportunity to successfully bring the seven-year-long transition to an end. They must capitalize on the security gains made by the Somali security forces, their allies and AMISOM, to further security, peace, reconciliation and prosperity. The process must remain transparent and credible. I therefore urge all Somalis, especially the political leadership, the traditional and religious leaders and civil society, to demonstrate the required maturity, commitment and spirit of reconciliation to rise to the challenges at hand.

35. As we enter a new political dispensation, with heightened expectations, I would like to reiterate the urgent and critical need to stabilize the areas liberated by the Somali security forces and AMISOM. Efforts in this respect should include the establishment of inclusive local governance structures, the promotion of reconciliation and the delivery of basic services. While the Somali authorities have a central role to play in this regard, they can succeed only if they enjoy the full support of the international community.

36. The African Union will continue to support the Somalis in their efforts. In the weeks ahead, particular attention will be devoted to achieving the remaining operational benchmarks for AMISOM, particularly as regards the full staffing and operationalization of its Force headquarters, the attainment of its authorized strength and the consolidation of its presence in the various Sectors situated outside Mogadishu, with a view to contributing to the expansion of State authority. In addition, the Mission will continue to work towards consolidating security in the liberated areas.

37. As stressed on numerous occasions, lasting security in Somalia requires that the relevant Somali institutions be endowed with the necessary capabilities. I note with satisfaction the completion of the concept of operations for the empowerment of the Somali security sector. It is now incumbent upon the international community to provide the necessary support to make the Somalis less reliant on outsiders for ensuring security in their country.

38. I would like, once again, to reiterate the African Union's gratitude to the United Nations and to the other bilateral and multilateral partners for their continued support to AMISOM. This support will remain critical in the period ahead, and more so as the Mission expands its operations. The achievements recorded in Somalia were made possible by the judicious combination of African Union and United Nations efforts and respective comparative advantages, with the invaluable support of other partners. Continued unity of purpose and concerted action among all international stakeholders remain critical for consolidating the gains made and achieving further progress.